EVIDENCE-SELF-INCRIMINATION-NEW JERSEY COMMON LAW
SELF-INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE INAPPLICABLE To CONTENTS
OF SUBPOENAED BUSINESS RECORDS OF SOLE PROPRIETOR-In

re Grand Jury Proceedings of Guarino, 104 N.J. 218, 516 A.2d
1063 (1986).
A hallmark of American jurisprudence is the notion that
compelling a person's unwilling testimony to convict him of a
crime is an improper exercise of governmental authority.' Commonly referred to as the "privilege against self-incrimination,"
the "privilege" is actually a federal constitutional right guaranteed by the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment.'
Additionally, the privilege against self-incrimination exists independently in state law, either in state constitutions or at common
law. 3 With respect to voluntarily prepared sole proprietorship
business records,4 the United States Supreme Court has held that
the fifth amendment privilege is inapplicable because the conI

See D. FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TODAY 304 (1976).

2 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides: "[N]o person shall be
... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ..
" Id. Developed at common law, the privilege is historically rooted in English resistance to the
excesses of the Court of Star Chamber under the Stuarts. State v. Deatore, 70 N.J.
100, 113 n.8, 358 A.2d 163, 170 n.8 (1976) (citing 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 440 (1883)). Brought to the American colonies as part

of the common law heritage, the privilege was ultimately enshrined as a federal
constitutional right. Id; see also Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935). In 1964, the
fifth amendment privilege was extended to the states via the fourteenth amendment
due process clause. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1964); see also MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE § 117 (3d ed. 1984).

3 See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at § 115. New Jersey guarantees the privilege
as a doctrine of common law. See FELLMAN, supra note 1, at 305-06, 306 n.8. See also
State v. Vinegra, 73 N.J. 484, 376 A.2d 150 (1977); State v. Fary, 19 N.J. 431, 117
A.2d 499 (1955); State v. Zdanowicz, 69 NJ.L. 79, 55 A. 743 (1903); Fries v.
Brugler, 12 N.J.L. 79 (Sup. Ct. 1830). As stated by the Zdanowicz court: "Although
we have not deemed it necessary to insert in our constitution this prohibitive provision, the common law, unaltered by legislation or by lax practice, is deemed by us
to have its full force. In New Jersey, no person can be compelled to be a witness

against himself." 69 N.J.L. at 622, 55 A. at 743. The NewJersey privilege is codified
as a rule of evidence. See N.J. R. EVID. 23-25, codified at, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A17 to -19 (West 1986). This rule provides: "Every person has in any criminal action
in which he is an accused a right not to be called as a witness and not to testify."
N.J.R. EvID. 23.
4 The business documents discussed in this casenote are not records required
to be kept by law, the contents of which have been held to be unprivileged under
the fifth amendment. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 33 (1948); State v.
Stoeger, 97 N.J. 391, 405, 478 A.2d 1175, 1182 (1984). But cf. Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968); Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965) (both
holding the exception to the privilege against self-incrimination for records re-

1988]

NOTES

155

tents of such documents are not the product, of governmental
coercion, and therefore not compelled testimony. 5 Notwithstanding this interpretation, since the privilege exists independently in state law, a state court can conclude that its state law
privilege affords a broader scope of protection than that provided by the fifth amendment. 6 The New Jersey Supreme Court
recently recognized a broader state self-incrimination privilege in
principle, but concluded that the privilege did not extend to the
voluntarily prepared business records of a sole proprietor in n re
GrandJury Proceedings of Guarino.7

In 1984, Green Acres Estates, a sole proprietorship real estate concern operated by Joseph Guarino became the target of a
state grand jury investigation.8 During the investigation of
Green Acres' activities, Guarino was served with a subpoena duces tecum.9 The subpoena ordered him to produce business docquired to be kept by law inapplicable where documentary requirement is "directed
at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities").
5 See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (contents of sole proprietor's business records not privileged under fifth amendment); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (compelled production of voluntarily prepared tax
records in possession of taxpayer's attorney not violative of fifth amendment).
6 See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (States
have the "sovereign right to adopt in [their] own constitution[s] individual liberties
more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution."). Justice Brennan commented in 1977 that "state constitutions .. .are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of federal law." Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection
of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977). It is a growing trend among state
courts to use state constitutions to provide greater protection of individual rights
than that afforded by parallel provisions in the United States Constitution. State v.
Hunt, 91 NJ. 338, 359, 450 A.2d 952, 962 (1982) (Handler, J., concurring). In
support of this proposition, Justice Handler's concurrence cited inter alia, Shiras v.
Britt, 267 Ark. 97. 99, 589 S.W.2d 18, 19 (1979); People v. Rucker, 26 Cal.2d 368,
389-91, 605 P.2d 843, 856, 162 Cal. Rptr. 13, 26 (1980); O'Connor v.Johnson, 287
N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979); Keene Publishing Corp. v. Cheshire County Super.
Ct., 119 N.H. 710, 711, 406 A.2d 137, 138 (1979); Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69,
79, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 1194, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 174 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984
(1980). See generally Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 324 (1982).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has vigorously applied this principle with
respect to the state constitutional provision governing search and seizure, despite
textual similarity to its federal counterpart. See State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 344, 450
A.2d 952, 955 (1982); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 225, 440 A.2d 1311, 1318
(1981); State v. Johnson, 68 NJ. 349, 353 n.2, 349 A.2d 66, 68 n.2 (1975).
7 104 N.J. 218, 516 A.2d 1063 (1986).
8 Id. at 220-21, 516 A.2d at 1064.
9 Id. at 221, 516 A.2d at 1064. A subpoena duces tecum isdefined as "[a] process by which the court, at the instances of a party, commands a witness who has in
his possession or control some document or paper that is pertinent to the issues of
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uments related to Green Acres' real estate transactions since
1970.10 Guarino moved to quash the subpoena." The trial court
dismissed Guarino's motion as untimely, however, and ordered
2
him to appear before the grand jury.'
Guarino made an appearance before the grand jury in June
1984, but refused to produce the subpoenaed documents, invoking his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. 13 Pursuant to the state immunity statute, the attorney general applied
for, and was granted, an order compelling Guarino to produce
the documents.' 4 The order also immunized Guarino from the
a pending controversy, to produce it at the trial." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1279
(5th ed. 1979).
10 Guarino, 104 N.J. at 221, 516 A.2d at 1064. The subpoena specifically directed Guarino to produce the following records:
1) all contracts for the sale of real estate (including conditional
land sales contracts) by or on behalf of Joseph Guarino d/b/a Green
Acres Estates, seller-grantor, in Burlington County and Cumberland
County (regardless of whose signature appears on behalf of the seller);
2) cash receipts journal and general ledger recording all payments
made by purchasers/grantees of property from Joseph Guarino d/b/a
Green Acres Estates in Cumberland and Burlington Counties (whether
payments are complete on [sic] ongoing; whether or not the deed has
been transferred);
3) all payment coupons or other documentation which reflect and
record payments made by purchasers/grantees of property from Green
Acres Estates in Burlington and Cumberland Counties.
Id.
II Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 221-22, 516 A.2d at 1064 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-17.3 (West
1986)). This section provides:
In any criminal proceeding before a court or grand jury, if a person
refuses to answer a question or produce evidence of any other kind on
the ground that he may be incriminated thereby and if the Attorney
General or the county prosecutor with the approval of the Attorney
General, in writing, requests the court to order that person to answer
the question or produce the evidence, the court shall so order and that
person shall comply with the order. After complying and if but for this
section, he would have been privileged to withhold the answer given or
the evidence produced by him, such testimony or evidence, or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or evidence,
may not be used against the person in any proceeding or prosecution
for a crime or offense concerning which he gave answer or produced
evidence under court order. However, he may nevertheless be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture for any perjury, false swearing or contempt committed in answering, or failing to answer, or in
producing, or failing to produce evidence in accordance with the order.
If a person refuses to testify after being ordered to testify as aforesaid,
he may be adjudged in contempt and committed to the county jail until
such time as he purges himself of contempt by testifying as ordered
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use of any evidence arising from the act of production. 1 5 Guarino again moved to quash the subpoena, contending that use of
the contents of the subpoenaed papers against him would violate
both his fifth amendment and New Jersey common law privilege
against self-incrimination. 16
The trial court denied Guarino's motion to quash the subpoena based on federal case law construing the fifth amendment.' 7 The judge refrained from deciding whether the state
privilege against self-incrimination provided greater protection
than the federal constitution, however, because the New Jersey
Supreme Court had never given a clear mandate on that issue."8
The trial court, therefore, ordered Guarino to produce the subpoenaed documents, but stayed the order pending appeal.' 9
In an unpublished per curiam decision, the appellate division reversed the trial court's order but urged that the supreme
court grant certification in order to conclusively determine the
scope of the state self-incrimination privilege with respect to
business records.2 0 The New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently granted certification . 2z The supreme court reversed the
appellate division judgment, and reinstated the order of the trial
court.2 2 The court held that the New Jersey common law privilege against self-incrimination, while broader than its fifth
without regard to the expiration of the grand jury; provided, however,
that if the grand jury before which he was ordered to testify has been
dissolved, he may then purge himself by testifying before the court.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-17.3 (West 1986).
15 Guarino, 104 N.J. at 221-22, 516 A.2d at 1064. The trial court's order specifically immunized Guarino from "the use of the evidence against him of the act of
production of said records in any proceeding or prosecution for a crime or offense,
concerning matters arising out of the act of production of the records produced
under order of the court pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. § 2A:81-17.3.
Id. at 222, 516 A.2d at 1064.
16 Id.
17 Id. The trial court relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). See infra notes 93-111 and accompanying text (discussing Doe). See generally Note, Abolition of Fifth Amendment Protectionfor
the Contents of Preexisting Documents: United States v. Doe, 38 S.W. L.J. 1023 (1984).
18 Guarino, 104 N.J. at 222, 516 A.2d at 1064.
19 Id. at 222, 516 A.2d at 1064-65.
20 In re GrandJury Proceedings ofJoseph Guarino, No. A-229-84T5, slip op. at
4 (App. Div. Mar. 28, 1985), revd, 104 N.J. 218, 516 A.2d 1063 (1986). The appellate court relied on the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in In re Addonizio, 53
N.J. 107, 248 A.2d 531 (1968). See infra notes 56-71 and accompanying text (discussing Addonizio).
21 In re GrandJury Proceedings of Guarino, 101 N.J. 306, 501 A.2d 962 (1985),
granting cert. to No. A-229-84T5, (App. Div. Mar. 28, 1985).
22 Guarino, 104 N.J. at 235, 516 A.2d at 1072.
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amendment counterpart, does not afford protection to business
records of any kind, including those of a sole proprietor, or sole
practitioner.23
The long-enduring axiom that an individual's incriminating
private papers are privileged from compelled disclosure derives
from Boyd v. United States,2 4 a landmark case in fifth amendment
self-incrimination clause analysis. In Boyd, a forfeiture action in
rem was brought by federal prosecutors against a business partnership, alleging a fraudulent failure to pay an import tax. 25 At
trial, the government entered into evidence a copy of an invoice
which had been subpoenaed from the partners.26 Objections
were raised both to the compulsory discovery of the invoice and
to its evidentiary use against the partnership. 27 Concluding that
the government's actions were "subversive of all the comforts of
society," ' 28 the United States Supreme Court held that the subpoena and use of the invoice against the property interests
of the
29
amendments.
fifth
and
fourth
the
violated
partners
The Boyd Court maintained that compelling an individual to
produce his private papers was equivalent to an unreasonable
search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment.30 The
Court reasoned that governmental searches and seizures of private papers were invasions of the owners "indefeasible right" to
private property. 3' The Court determined that the constitution23 See id.
24 116 U.S. 616
25 See id. at 617.

(1886).
The Court identified the forfeiture action as a quasi-criminal
proceeding. Id. at 634.
26 Id. at 618.
27 Id. at 621. Specifically, the Boyds raised fourth and fifth amendment objections. Id.
28 Id. at 628 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (K.B.
1765), reprinted in abbreviatedform at 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765)).
29 Id. at 634-35.
30 Id. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Court equated a subpoena with a search and seizure
because a subpoena "effects the sole object and purpose of [a] search and seizure."
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622.
31 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. The Boyd court elaborated: "The great end for which
men entered into society was to secure their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances where it has not been taken away or
abridged by some public law for the good of the whole." Id. at 627 (citation
omitted).
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ality of a search and seizure under the fourth amendment turned
on the question of common law property rights.3 2 In this regard,
the Court distinguished governmental seizure of stolen, forfeited, or smuggled goods from seizures of an individual's private
books and papers: "In the [former] case, the government is entitled to possession of the property; in the [latter] it is not."13 3 Accordingly, the Court concluded that search warrants and
subpoenas were only permissible where the government was acting under a superior claim to title or possession.3 4
Addressing the defendants' fifth amendment claim, the Boyd
Court ruled that compelling an individual to submit his private
papers to be used as evidence against him violated the right
against self-incrimination.3 5 The Court reasoned that there was
no substantial difference between using a person's private papers
36
against him and compelling his incriminating oral testimony.
Thus, the Court declared that any attempt to compel production
of a person's property to obtain incriminating evidence against
him violated the fifth amendment.3 7
In the years following Boyd, through the mid-1970's, the
See id.at 623.
Id. Boyd's fourth amendment property rights rationale served as the basis for
the "mere evidence rule." See Bradley, ConstitutionalProtectionfor Private Papers, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 465-66. The mere evidence rule prohibited as unreasonable the seizure of property which did not fall within the categories of fruits and
instrumentalities of criminal activity or contraband. Id.; see also Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921). The protection of property rights also served to
generally protect privacy. Bradley, supra at 466. The mere evidence rule was ultimately abandoned. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309-10 (1967) ("[T]he principle object of the [f]ourth [a]mendment is the protection of privacy rather than
property"). For a discussion of the Boyd opinion and its subsequent abandonment
by the Supreme Court, see generally Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self-Incrimination
and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1979).
34 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623-24.
35 Id. at 634-35. The Boyd court stated: "Compelling the production of... private books and papers ...is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may
suit the purposes of despotic power; but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of
political liberty and personal freedom." Id. at 631-32.
36 Id. at 633. The Court repeatedly referred to the invoice as a "private paper."
Commentators generally agree that this was only intended to mean that the invoice
was private property. Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents-Cutting
Fisher's Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. REV. 439, 446 (1984); see also Bradley, supra note 10,
at 465; Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 955 (1977). Cases citing Boyd
have suggested, however, that the Court was attempting to protect an expectation
of privacy in the contents of an invoice. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S.
85, 91-92 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 348 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
37 Heidt, supra note 36, at 446.
32
33
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United States Supreme Court gradually modified and rearticulated the various policies and criteria determinative of the scope
of the fifth amendment privilege.3 8 Some of Boyd's specific pronouncements were attenuated or discredited in this process. 3 9
The Court continued to cite Boyd, however, as an authoritative
decision in fifth amendment jurisprudence.4"
The standard that evolved from Boyd generally sought to
protect the individual against overbearing or inhuman governmental treatment 4' and to preserve "an accusatorial rather than
an inquisitorial system of criminal justice. "42 In particular, the
Court adhered to the so-called collective entity rule, which holds
that the fifth amendment privilege is strictly personal and applies
On this basis, the Court held that the
only to natural persons.
privilege does not extend to corporations and other collective or
organizational entities, or to their representative agents.4 4 Furthermore, the Court required that some form of "physical or
moral compulsion" be exercised upon the individual to be incriminated before it finds that the fifth amendment has been violated.4 5 Thus, voluntary admissions or incriminating evidence
produced by a third party are not privileged.4 6 Finally, the Court
required that to invoke the privilege it is necessary that the evidence sought to be compelled is "testimonial or communicative"
in nature.4 7 Abandoning Boyd's property oriented conception of
38

See Note, supra note 36, at 945; see also infra notes 40-49 and accompanying

text.
See Note, supra note 36, at 945.
Id.; see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1974); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 330 (1973); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64
(1966). By the end of its ninety year metamorphosis, Boyd was primarily cited in
support of the limited propositions that the fifth amendment "privilege applies to
the business records of the sole proprietor or sole practitioner as well as to personal documents containing more intimate information about the individual's private life." Bellis, 417 U.S. at 87-88.
41 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
42 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
43 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
44 Id. at 701; see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 94-96 (1974) (fifth
amendment privilege does not extend to business partnerships); McPhaul v. United
States, 364 U.S. 372, 380 (1960) (fifth amendment privilege does not extend to
political organizations); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911) (fifth
amendment privilege does not extend to corporations).
45 Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918).
46 Id.; see also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) (fifth amendment
prohibits compelling an individual to bear witness against himself, not against obtaining incriminating evidence from a third party).
47 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). In Schmerber, the Court
stated that "the privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify
39
40
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the fifth amendment, the Court maintained that protection of
personal privacy was the underlying objective of the fifth amendment.4 8 Consequently, while a person's "communicative" private papers continued to be privileged,4 9 the privilege extended
only to those papers in which "an expectation of protected privacy or confidentiality" had been demonstrated with respect to
the contents.50
While the United States Supreme Court was defining the parameters of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the New Jersey common law privilege was also evolving
along essentially parallel lines. 5 ' Although not expressly guaranagainst himself, or otherwise provide.., evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature." Id. Specifically included within this definition of protected evidence
were the contents of an individual's incriminating private papers. Id. at 763-64.
48 See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973) (the privilege "respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought"); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("The [f]ifth [a]mendment ... enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy."); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,
55 (1964) (the fifth amendment respects "the right of each individual 'to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life.' "). In Murphy, Justice Goldberg summarized the values and policies protected by the fifth amendment privilege:
[The privilege] reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble
aspirations; our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference
for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice;
our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane
treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair stateindividual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual
alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire
load;" our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of
the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life;" our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes a "shelter to the guilty," is often
"a protection to the innocent."
Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
49 See supra note 47.
50 Couch, 409 U.S. at 335-36 (1973); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85,
92 (1974) (business partnership financial records not sufficiently private or confidential for fifth amendment privilege to attach).
51 Compare Board of Health, Weehawken Tp. v. New York Central R.R. Co., 10
N.J. 284, 289, 90 A.2d 736, 738 (1952) (privilege against self-incrimination unavailable to corporations and other artificial entities) and State v. Alexander, 7 N.J. 585,
589, 83 A.2d 441, 445 (1951) (privilege against self-incrimination does not proscribe compelled submission of physical evidence), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 908 (1952)
and Bianchi v. Hoffman, 36 N.J. Super. 435, 438, 116 A.2d 206, 208 (App. Div.
1955) (privilege against self-incrimination does not proscribe compelled disclosure
of records required by law to keep) with United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698
(1944) (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies only to natural
individuals) and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (fifth amendment privilege does not proscribe compulsion upon accused to submit real or phys-
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teed by the state constitution,5 2 the common law privilege was
statutorily confirmed in 1855, 5 and is presently codified in the
state rules of evidence.5 4 In 1964, the fifth amendment privilege
was also explicitly extended to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.5 5 Four years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court
analyzed the scope of the fifth amendment privilege within the
context of a grand jury subpoena duces tecum for personal finan56
cial papers in In re Addonizio.
A state grand jury investigating the alleged corrupt practices
of Newark city officials, subpoenaed the personal financial
records of the mayor, Hugh Addonizio. 5 7 Addonizio objected to
the subpoena and refused to produce the records. 5 ' He conical evidence) and Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 17 (1948) (fifth amendment
does not proscribe compelled production of records required to be kept by law).
The parallel between the fifth amendment and New Jersey privilege against
self-incrimination is evidenced further by the reliance upon federal precedent in
the legislative history of New Jersey evidence rules 23, 24, and 25, which codify the
state common law privilege. See COMMISSION TO STUDY THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE, REPORT TO THE SENATE AND GEN. ASSEMBLY OF NEW JERSEY OF

1956, at 28-31 (1956). Regarding the definition of incrimination in rule 24, the
report stated: "The definition adopted by this Commission is that enunciated by
the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Hoffman." Id. at 30
(Comment to proposed amendment to rule 24) (citing 341 U.S. 479 (1951)). Similarly, discussing exceptions to the privilege against self-incrimination in rule 25, the
report stated: "This rule is the corollary to the constitutional right against selfincrimination." Id. at 31 (Comment to proposed amendment to rule 25). See also
Supplemental Letter in Lieu of Brief and Appendix on Behalf of the State of New
Jersey at 4-5, In re GrandJury Proceedings of Guarino, 104 NJ. 218, 516 A.2d 1063
(1986) (No. 23,926).
52 See supra note 3.
53 See Act of April 5, 1855, ch. 236, 1974 N.J. Laws 668 (codified as amended at
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-17 to -19 (West 1986)).
54 See supra note 3.
55 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). "The [f]ourteenth [a]mendment
secures against state invasion the same privilege that the [fnifth [a]mendment guarantees against federal infringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless
he choose[s] to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no
penalty . . . for such silence." Id.
56 53 NJ. 107, 248 A.2d 531 (1968).
57 Id. at 113, 248 A.2d at 534. The subpoenaed records included Addonizio's
personal savings and checking account statements, lists of his real and personal
property holdings, and lists of all his investments. Id. at 113, 248 A.2d at 534-35.
58 Id. at 113, 248 A.2d at 534. Addonizio raised fourth and fifth amendment
objections to the subpoena. Id. Addonizio also attempted to quash a second subpoena directed to a bank and brokerage company demanding records of their
transactions with him. Id. at 112, 248 A.2d at 534. The court rejected Addonizio's
contention that the bank and brokerage house records were also privileged. Id. at
131, 248 A.2d at 545. The records were unprivileged because they did not belong
to him, and therefore, "the subpoena touched nothing in which Addonizio [had] a
property right." Id.
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tended that the subpoenaed records were privileged because
they could be used to incriminate him of official misconduct.5 9
He further contended that absent a grant of immunity, production of the records could not be compelled even for the limited
purpose of in camera review.6 °
The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld Addonizio's claim of
privilege because he was a target of the grand jury's investigation
and not merely a witness. 6 ' Chief Justice Weintraub, writing for
a unanimous court, observed that in most instances a witness'
claim of privilege must be reviewed and sustained by the trial
court to ensure the claim's validity, before requiring the attorney
62
general to decide whether or not to offer the witness immunity.

ChiefJustice Weintraub reasoned that a review of the merits was
required to prevent "fraudulent or frivolous interruption[s] of
trials and hearings, ' 63 and to provide the attorney general with
information on which to base a decision on whether to offer immunity.64 The Chief Justice noted, however, that when a witness
is in fact the target of investigation, no more than his claim of
possible self-incrimination is needed to validate his fifth amendment privilege.65 Concluding that it was "inconceivable" that
59 Id. at 114, 248 A.2d at 535.
60 See id. Addonizio sought immunity pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-17.3
(West 1986). Id. See supra note 14 for text of this statute.
61 Addonizio, 53 N.J. at 116-17, 248 A.2d at 536 (citing State v. DeCola, 33 N.J.
335, 341-42, 164 A.2d 729, 732 (1960); In re Boiardo, 34 N.J. 599, 604-06, 170
A.2d 816, 819-20 (1961)).
62 Id. at 115, 248 A.2d at 536.
63 Id. at 116, 248 A.2d at 536.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 117, 248 A.2d at 536. The protection afforded grand jury target wit-

nesses in New Jersey has traditionally been broadly construed. See State v. DeCola,
33 N.J. 335, 342, 164 A.2d 729, 732 (1960). The DeCola court stated that "a person

whose criminal liability is the object of the grand jury inquiry must be informed of
his privilege to withhold evidence tending to his own incrimination." Id. The court
reasoned that "[i]f there is a duty to warn, the privilege not to testify is implicit."
Id. The remedy for failing to warn a target witness is to quash the ensuing criminal
indictment. See State v. Vinegra, 73 N.J. 484, 488, 376 A.2d 150, 152 (1970) (not-

ing with approval the lower court practice of quashing criminal indictments resulting from evidence obtained from uninformed grand jury targets). In this respect,
the New Jersey privilege against self incrimination offers greater protection to potential criminal defendants than does the fifth amendment. Cf. United States v.
Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977) (holding that failure to warn grand jury witness

that he is the target of investigation is insufficient grounds to quash resulting criminal indictment, or suppress evidence derived from his testimony under federal
law.).
This "target doctrine" has been modified as applied to public employees. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-17.2al (West 1986). Enacted in 1970, the statute requires
all public employees "to appear and testify upon matters directly related to the
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Addonizio's records "could reveal criminality upon the part of
others without also implicating him,"' 6 6 the court held the contents of the records privileged.67 Although specifically framed in
terms of the fifth amendment, the court noted that its holding
was also consonant with principles of state common law predating the fifth amendment mandate on the states.68
In reaching its decision, the court observed that the fifth
amendment privilege precludes use of a subpoena to obtain incriminating evidence from a criminal suspect that should be
seized by search warrant. 69 By way of example, the court noted
that a criminal defendant cannot "be subpoenaed to produce the
gun or loot, no matter how probable the cause." ' 70 Equating the
enforcement of a subpoena for incriminating documents with the
compulsory production of the instrumentality or fruit of a crime,
the court concluded that the fifth amendment proscribes the use
of governmental coercion upon the individual to 7compel the production of anything that might incriminate him. '

Eight years later, however, the United States Supreme Court
reassessed the goals and principles of fifth amendment jurisprudence as they relate to production of personal papers in Fisher v.
United States.7 2 In Fisher, the Court held for the first time that the
fifth amendment does not protect individuals from being compelled to produce their own incriminating records. 73 Fisher involved challenges by taxpayers to IRS summonses requiring the
taxpayers to produce tax records which had been prepared by
accountants and subsequently transferred to the taxpayers' attorneys. 7 ' The Court rejected the taxpayers' assertion of fifth
amendment privilege, holding that compliance with the sumconduct of [their] office and subjecting [them] to removal if [they] fail to do so."
Vinegra, 73 N.J. at 489, 376 A.2d at 152 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-17.2al
(West 1986)). The statute, however, also confers use immunity upon the employee
for any incriminating evidence that may be derived from his testimony. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-17.2a2 (West 1986).
66 Addonizio, 53 N.J. at 117, 248 A.2d at 536.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 129, 248 A.2d at 543.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
73 See id. at 415. See also Note, supra note 36, at 975 (commenting on the unprecedented nature of the Court's holding).
74 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 393-95. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases of
Fisher v. United States, 500 F.2d 683 (3rd Cir. 1974) and United States v. Kasmir,
499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974). See 420 U.S. 906 (1975). Both cases involved almost
identical facts. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 393-95.
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monses did not require any form of coerced self-incrimination.7 5
The Court determined that the records did not contain testimonial declarations of the taxpayers because they were prepared by
persons other than the taxpayers themselves. 76 The Court reasoned, moreover, that since the records had been voluntarily prepared, their contents had not been compelled. 7 7 The criteria for
fifth amendment protection, the Court concluded, was not
whether the person asserting the privilege had written the docu78
ment, but whether the government had compelled the writing.
The Court acknowledged that the proscription against compulsory disclosure of a person's incriminating papers had been consistently upheld in cases dating back to United States v. Boyd, but
stated that much of the79rationale underlying this rule had "not
stood the test of time."

Writing for the majority, Justice White stated that in order
for the fifth amendment privilege to attach, three elements must
be present: compulsion, incrimination, and a testimonial communication. 80 Privacy was specifically rejected as a factor in this
analysis.8 1 While conceding that privacy may be incidentally protected by the privilege, Justice White flatly rejected the notion
that protection of privacy is a fifth amendment goal. 82 He as75 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414.
76 Id.

at 409.

Id. at 409-10.
78 Id. at 410 n. ll.
79 Id. at 407. The Court noted the limited applicability of the fourth amendment
to subpoenas. Id. (citing Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)). The Court also noted that Boyd's property
based fourth amendment rationale, the "mere evidence" rule, had been abandoned. Id. (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)). The Court further
observed that, under certain circumstances, the seizure and use of "testimonial"
evidence was constitutionally permissible. Id. at 407-08 (citing Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Osborn v.
United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) (all approving, under appropriate safeguards,
the recording of conversations of persons suspected of crimes)).
80 See id. at 410.
81 See id. at 399.
82 Id. at 399-401. Justice White explained that the fifth amendment was not violated by all privacy invasions, only by those which come within the purview of its
specific language. Id. at 399. The Court limited fifth amendment personal privacy
guarantees to those invasions involving "compelled testimonial self-incrimination
of some sort." Id. Justice White reasoned that:
If the [flifth [a]mendment protected generally against the obtaining of
privation information ... its protections would presumably not be lifted
by probable cause and a warrant or by immunity. The privacy invasion
is not mitigated by immunity; and the [f]ifth [a]mendment's strictures,
unlike the [faourth's, are not removed by showing reasonableness.
Id. at 400. Justice White asserted that only the fourth amendment provides general
77
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serted, rather, that the fifth amendment does not protect
"against the obtaining of private information from a man's
mouth, or pen, or house," unless morally or physically extorted
from him.83
While rejecting fifth amendment protection for the contents
of subpoenaed documents, the Court acknowledged that certain
unspoken communicative features implicit in the act of producing them in compliance with a subpoena may be protected.84
These include the subpoenaed person's admission of the document's existence, his possession or control over them, and his
belief that the documents produced are the documents requested.85 Justice White observed that these tacit averments
may, under some circumstances, rise to the level of incriminating
testimony worthy of fifth amendment protection.86 With respect
to the records in question, however, the Court concluded that
these concerns were inapposite because "[t]he existence and location of the [tax records were] a foregone conclusion" and the
government therefore was "not relying on the 'truthtelling' of
the taxpayer[s]." 87
The Fisher majority's approach to fifth amendment document
production analysis drew criticism from Justice Brennan in a concurring opinion.

8

Justice Brennan took issue with the majority's

rejection of privacy protection as a factor in determining the
scope of the fifth amendment. 89 He expressed concern that the
protection for private information. Id. at 400-01. The Court interpreted the specific reference to privacy interests in the fourth amendment and the exclusion of
such references in the text of the fifth amendment as evidence of the framers' intent
to provide for the protection of privacy only within the scope of the fourth amendment. Id. The Court concluded, therefore, that potentially incriminating private
information not obtained by compelled testimony is protected only under the
fourth amendment. Id. at 401. Consequently, the protection of subpoenaed private information is limited to only the fourth amendment requirements of specificity and reasonableness. Id.
83 Id. at 400.
84 Id. at 410.
85 Id.
86 Id. The Court stated that categorical answers may not be appropriate to determine whether admissions implicit in the act of production merit fifth amendment
protection, and suggested that such determinations may depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. Id.
87
88

Id. at 411.

Id. at 414 (Brennan, J., concurring).
89 Id. at 416 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment because he determined that the accountants' access to the records voided any
legitimate expectation of privacy on the part of the petitioners. Id. at 414. Justice
Brennan also stressed that the records were business rather than personal private
papers. Id.
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majority's analysis foreshadowed the end of self-incrimination
protection for "private papers." 90 Declaring that preserving individual privacy was a fundamental purpose of the privilege
against self-incrimination,9" Justice Brennan asserted that the
reasoning of the majority ran contrary to the history and principles of fifth amendment jurisprudence.9 2
In the 1984 decision of United States v. Doe, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed and clarified Fisher's analysis of compulsory document production under the fifth amendment.93 Doe involved a
sole proprietor's effort to quash several grand jury subpoenas requiring him to produce certain personally prepared business
records in his possession. 9 4 In a two-part holding, the Court
stated that the voluntarily prepared contents of a sole proprietor's business records are not privileged from compelled production under the fifth amendment,9 5 but any incriminating
testimonial admissions arising from the act of producing them in
compliance with a subpoena are privileged.9 6 Consequently, the
Court concluded that, absent a grant of use immunity for the act
Id. at 414-15 (Brennan, J., concurring).
91 See id. at 419. Justice Brennan provided the following rationale for the continued protection of private papers:
An individual's books and papers are generally little more than an
extension of his person. They reveal no less than he could reveal upon
being questioned directly. Many of the matters within an individual's
knowledge may as easily be retained within his head as set down on a
scrap of paper. I perceive no principle which does not permit compelling one to disclose the contents of one's mind but does permit compelling the disclosure of the contents of that scrap of paper by compelling
its production. Under a contrary view, the constitutional protection
would turn on fortuity, and persons would, at their peril, record their
thoughts and the events of their lives. The ability to think private
thoughts, facilitated as it is by pen and paper, and the ability to preserve
intimate memories would be curtailed through fear that those thoughts
or the events of those memories would become the subject of criminal
sanctions however invalidly imposed.
Id. at 420.
92 See id. at 416-17 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall also filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 430 (Marshall, J., concurring) Justice Marshall reiterated
many of Justice Brennan's concerns, but expressed confidence that the new approach would continue to provide almost complete protection against the compelled disclosure of private papers. Id. at 432 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice
Marshall concluded that the recognition of testimonial admissions in the act of production, particularly the verification of a document's existence possession, would
afford almost total protection for private papers because the existence and possession of these papers could rarely be assumed. Id.
93 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
94 See id. at 606-07.
95 Id. at 612.
96 Id. at 617.
90
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of production, a person cannot be compelled to produce his
records if the act of producing them serves to implicitly admit
their existence, his possession or control of them, and their
9 7
authenticity.
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell stated that the respondent could not "avoid compliance with the subpoena merely
by asserting that the item of evidence which he is required to
produce contains incriminating writing."' 98 Citing Fisher,Justice
Powell reasoned that the possession and preparation of the contents of subpoenaed papers were not the crucial issues in selfincrimination analysis. 9 9 Rather, the pivotal determination was
whether preparation was the result of governmental coercion. 0 0
Finding no allegation of coercion in the record, the Court held
that the contents of the subpoenaed business documents were
unprivileged.' 0 '
Turning to the question of whether privilege exists in the act
of producing documents in compliance with a subpoena, the
Court recognized, as it had in Fisher, that the act of production
"may have testimonial aspects and an incriminating effect."' 10 2
The Court reiterated that compliance with a subpoena may implicitly authenticate the contents of the documents, and in addition concede their existence, possession or control. 0 3 Faced
with the district court's express finding that the act of production
would compel testimonial self-incrimination, the Court affirmed
the extension of privilege to the act of production. 0 4 The Court
observed that production could have been compelled if use immunity had been granted with respect to the potentially incriminating evidence. 10 5 It noted, however, that immunity would not
10 6
have extended to the contents of the documents.
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor clarified a point
she believed was implicitly adopted in the majority's opinion:
See id.
98 Id. at 611 (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410).
99 Id. at 611-12.
100 See id. at 610.
101 See id. at 611-12.
102 Id. at 612.
103 Id. at 612-13.
104 Id. at 613-14.
105 Id. at 614-15. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 to -03 (1982) (detailing procedural requirements for grant of federal use immunity).
106 Doe, 465 U.S at 617 n. 17. The Court explained that immunity for the contents
was not required, because a "grant of immunity need be only as broad as the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. (citation omitted).
97
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"that the [f]ifth [a]mendment provides absolutely no protection
for the contents of private papers of any kind."' 10 7 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, disputed Justice O'Connor's assertion in a concurring and dissenting opinion. 1 8 In Justice
Marshall's view, the majority opinion did not consider whether
the contents of private papers were protected under the fifth
amendment.1 0 9 He asserted, rather, that the papers at issue in
Doe were business papers involving a lesser privacy interest than
truly private papers. ° Justice Marshall maintained that while
the documents in question were not protected, nonetheless
"there are certain documents no person ought to be compelled
to produce at the Government's request." 1 '
Against the background of federal reassessment of the principles and goals of fifth amendment jurisprudence, the New
Jersey Supreme Court granted certification in the Guarino case. In
Guarino, the court analyzed for the first time the underlying policies and principles of New Jersey's common law self-incrimination privilege with respect to the compelled disclosure of
incriminating documents.1 12 While rejecting the analytical
framework endorsed by the Fisher and Doe cases," 3 the court
nonetheless held that the New Jersey privilege against self-incrimination does not afford protection to a sole proprietor's business records. 1 4 The court ruled that a sole proprietor lacked an
expectation of privacy regarding business records and therefore
the common law privilege did not attach." 5
Justice Garibaldi, writing for the majority, began her legal
analysis with an examination of the protections afforded a sole
107 Id. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor maintained that "the
notion that the fifth amendment protects the privacy of papers originated in Boyd v.
United States." Id. (citing Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630). Justice O'Connor observed, however, that "the Court's decision in Fisherv. United States sounded the death knell for
Boyd" a decision which the Justice stated "ha[d] long been a rule searching for a
rationale." Id. (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409).
108 Id. at 619 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109 Id.

110

Id.

I I Id. Justice Marshall contends that the fifth amendment continues to protect
the privacy interests of inherently personal papers which "lie at the heart of our
sense of privacy," such as personal diaries and letters. Id. (quoting Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 350 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
112 See Guarino, 104 N.J. at 231, 516 A.2d at 1069. Justice Garibaldi noted that
the case was one of first impression. Id.
'

113 Id. at 232, 516 A.2d at 1070.

114 Id.
1'.

Id.
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proprietor's business papers under the fifth amendment." 6 Citing the collective entity rule, the court noted that the strictly personal nature of the constitutional privilege precludes its use by
corporations, partnerships and other organizational entities, or
by their representative agents." 7 Justice Garibaldi posited that
the United States Supreme Court had employed the collective
entity rationale in Fisher and Doe to further restrict fifth amendment protection of business records, including those of sole
proprietors." 8
The court observed that before Fisher, the Supreme Court
had consistently held that individuals were protected from compelled disclosure of their private papers by the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment. 119 Justice Garibaldi explained
that the rationale behind this proscription was to protect privacy
and to extinguish "the fear that private thoughts recorded on paper might become the object of criminal sanction. "120 The Guarino court further observed that prior to Fisher and Doe the
Supreme Court had expansively interpreted the proscription
against compelled disclosure to protect the contents of a sole
proprietor's business records in addition to the more intimate in12
formation contained in an individual's private papers.
The court recognized, therefore, that the reasoning articulated in Fisher and Doe represented a significant departure from

prior decisions. 122 Justice Garibaldi observed that in Fisher the
Court had narrowed the scope of the self-incrimination privilege
by adhering to a literal interpretation of the proscriptions of the
fifth amendment. 123 Under the Supreme Court's new criteria,
the privilege was perceived not as a shield against government
discovery of private information, but rather as a proscription
against the use of coercion to compel the making of an incriminating testimonial communication. 1 24 The Guarino court also
noted that the fact the papers in Fisher were prepared by an accountant, rather than the taxpayer, was crucial to the Court's
116 Id. at 222, 516 A.2d at 1065. Justice Handler, joined by justices Clifford and
Pollock, filed a dissenting opinion. Id.at 235, 516 A.2d at 1072.
'17 See id.at 222-23, 516 A.2d at 1065.
118 Id.at 223, 516 A.2d at 1065.

119 Id.

Id. at 223-24, 516 A.2d
Id. at 224, 516 A.2d at
(1974)).
122 Id.
123 See id. at 224, 516 A.2d
124 Id. at 224-25, 516 A.2d
120
121

at 1065.
1065 (citing Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87
at 1066 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 396).
at 1066.
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determination that the fifth amendment was not offended by
the compulsory production of a taxpayer's incriminating workpapers. 125 Justice Garibaldi observed that, according to Fisher,
the workpapers were not considered the taxpayer's testimonial
communication; nor were they considered his compelled declaration because they were prepared voluntarily. 126 Consequently,
under Fisher, the fifth amendment was not offended, even though
the subpoena for the workpapers production involved
a consid27
1
taxpayer.
the
upon
compulsion
of
degree
erable
The Guarino court further observed, however, that Fisherhad
recognized two situations where the potential for testimonial
self-incrimination might exist in the act of production. 128 First,
the act of production might serve to concede the existence of evidence as well as its control or possession by the subpoenaed
party.129 Second, the act of producing evidence in response to a
subpoena might serve to "authenticate" the contents of the evidence produced. 3 ° Under these circumstances, the Guarino
court concluded that the act of producing subpoenaed evidence
may have privileged "communicative aspects of its own wholly
aside from the contents of the papers produced.'

' 3'

The Guarino court next analyzed the application of the Fisher
test to the personally prepared sole proprietorship business
records in United States v. Doe.' 32 The court observed that in Doe,
the fact that the records were compelled from the petitioner's
possession was irrelevant to the determination of whether their
preparation was compelled.1 33 The court noted that the contents
of the records were unprivileged because the subpoena for their
production compelled neither their involuntary preparation nor
an oral restatement, repetition or affirmation that their contents
were true. 3 4 Under this analysis, the Guarino majority concluded, "the contents of business records, whether from a corpoId. at 225, 516 A.2d at 1066 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409).
Id. (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-10).
127 Id. (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409).
128 Id. at 226, 516 A.2d at 1067 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410).
129 Id.
130 Id. (citing United States v. Beattie, 522 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1975)). Justice Garibaldi noted the court's observation in Beattie that "[a] subpoena demanding that an
accused produce his own records is ... the equivalent of requiring him to take the
stand and admit their genuineness." Id. (quoting Beattie, 522 F.2d at 270).
131 Id. (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410).
132 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
'33 Guarino, 104 N.J. at 227, 516 A.2d at 1067.
134 Id.
125
126
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ration, a partnership or a sole proprietor
are no longer privileged
35
under the [f]ifth [a]mendment."'1

The Guarino majority noted, however, that the Doe Court
continued to recognize the distinction drawn in Fisher between a
subpoenaed document's contents and the act of its production. 136 In Doe, the act of production was privileged, even though
the contents were not, because the act of production was found
to involve a self-incriminating testimonial admission.137 Justice
Garibaldi also observed that under Doe the production of subpoenaed documents may still be compelled by granting use immunity even when the documents
contain potentially incriminating
38
testimonial evidence.'

Applying the Fisher-Doe analysis to the facts of Guarino, Justice Garibaldi observed that the subpoenaed real estate contracts
and payment documentation "were clearly business, not personal
records."'' 39 The justice also recognized that the subpoena did
not compel the involuntary creation of the documents, nor did it
require the repetition, restatement, or authentication of the truth
of their contents. 140 Moreover, the justice noted that the prosecutors had extended use immunity for any incriminating testimo14 1
nial evidence arising from the act of producing the documents.
The court held, therefore, that the subpoena of records from
Guarino's sole
proprietorship did not violate the fifth
42
amendment.1

The court next examined New Jersey common law to determine whether independent state principles might provide a basis
for resisting compulsory production of a sole proprietor's business records. 4 3 In this regard, the court emphasized that
"[s]tate common law may provide greater protection to individual rights than afforded under the United States Constitution." 144 The court observed that criminal defendants were
provided greater protection under the state privilege than under
135 Id. at 228, 516 A.2d at 1068.
136

Id. at 228, 516 A.2d at 1067-68 (citing Doe, 465 U.S. at 612-13).

137 See id. (citing Doe, 465 U.S. at 614-15).

Id. (citing Doe, 465 U.S. at 614-15, 617-18).
Id. The court further observed that the underlying facts of the case were
nearly identical to those in Doe. Id. at 226, 516 A.2d at 1067.
140 Id. at 228, 516 A.2d at 1068.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 228-29, 516 A.2d at 1068.
143 Id. at 229, 516 A.2d at 1068.
144 Id. (citations omitted).
138
139

19881

NOTES

173

the fifth amendment. 145 The court explained that although the
New Jersey privilege is not expressly incorporated in the state
constitution, but rather is only codified as a rule of evidence, the
common law doctrine has always been rigorously applied to ensure that "no person can be compelled to be a witness against
himself."' 4 6
Citing Boyd v. United States,14 7 Justice Garibaldi stated that the
concept of personal privacy was fundamental to the New Jersey
common law privilege against self-incrimination. 148 She posited
that the Boyd concept of fifth amendment privacy had been incorporated in New Jersey common law as a significant factor determining the scope of the privilege even before the fifth
amendment was held binding upon the states.' 49 Justice Garibaldi asserted that the privilege against self-incrimination "enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government
may not force him to surrender to his detriment."' 150 She noted
further that the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized in In re
Addonizio that protection of privacy was a fundamental goal of the
privilege against self-incrimination and held that personal financial records were privileged from compelled production. 5'
On the basis of these principles, the Guarino court declined
to follow the Fisher-Doe criteria in determining the scope of the
common law privilege. 152 Rather, the court noted that Fisher and
Doe failed to recognize the basic principles of personal privacy
145 Id. See, e.g., State v. Vinegra, 73 N.J. 484, 376 A.2d 150 (1977) (state privilege
affords greater protection to grand jury "target witnesses" than that provided
under the fifth amendment); State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 358 A.2d 163 (1976)
(holding that defendant's post-arrest silence may not be used in cross-examination
to impeach his alibi defense, even if such protection is not required by federal law).
146 Guarino, 104 N.J. at 229-30, 516 A.2d at 1068-69 (quoting State v. Hartley,
103 N.J. 252, 286, 511 A.2d 80, 98 (1986), quoting State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L.
619, 622, 55 A. 743, 744 (1903)).
147 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
148 Guarino, 104 N.J. at 230, 516 A.2d at 1069.
149 See id. (citing In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 93 A.2d 176 (1952)). The Guanino court
noted that in PiUo, Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme
Court, stated that the "wide acceptance and broad interpretation [of the privilege]
rests on the view that compelling a person to convict himself of a crime . . . 'cannot
abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom.' " Id. (quoting
PiUo, 11 N.J. at 15-16, 93 A.2d at 179-80, quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 632) (brackets
by the court)).
150 Id. at 230-31, 516 A.2d at 1069 (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 416 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
151 Id. at 232, 516 A.2d at 1069 (citing Addonizio, 53 N.J. at 107, 248 A.2d at 531
(1968)).
152 Id. at 232, 516 A.2d at 1070.
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underlying the NewJersey privilege. 15 3 Justice Garibaldi emphasized that the significant question in determining the availability
of the state common law privilege was not whether testimonial
compulsion was involved in producing subpoenaed papers, but
whether a legitimate expectation of privacy was manifest with respect to the contents of particular documents. 5 4 The justice
ruled that to make this determination a court must examine the
contents of subpoenaed papers to protect "the individual's right
'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life.'-15
While affirming that the protection of personal privacy was
an underlying goal of the New Jersey common law privilege, the
majority nonetheless determined that business records, even
15 6
those of a sole proprietor, were not entitled to protection.
The majority reasoned that business records, the purpose of
which is merely to record business transactions, are devoid of the
essential element of confidentiality or privacy necessary for common law privilege to attach. 1 57 The court distinguished business
records from personal papers, explaining that business records
may be "disclosed to a significant number of individuals," unlike
diaries and letters, and thus are not extensions of the intimate
aspects of an individual's life.' 5 8 The court posited that "[i]n today's highly computerized, commercialized and regulated world"
such business records inherently lack any expectation of
privacy.'59
The Guarino majority further stated that to protect a sole
proprietor's business records and not those of other business associations would constitute an inequitable anomaly. 160 The ma153 Id.

Id. at 231-32, 516 A.2d at 1070.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 232, 516 A.2d at 1070.
157 Id. at 232-33, 516 A.2d at 1070 (citing Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92
(1974)).
158 Id. at 233-34, 516 A.2d at 1070-71. The court identified the subpoened documents requested in Guarino as illustrative of the records of a sole proprietor which
are not entitled to protection: "contracts of sale, cash receipts, journals and general ledgers." Id. at 234, 516 A.2d at 1071. The court explained that because such
documents "are presumedly reviewed by the purchasers, their attorneys and their
accountants, [and] then [are] used in preparing the purchasers tax returns and possibly filed at county recording offices," these business records lose any expectation
of privacy. Id.
159 The court concluded that records such as the subpoenaed documents in
Guarino may be available to others "to an extent [which is] totally inconsistent with
any claim of privacy." Id.
160 Id. at 233-34, 516 A.2d at 1070-71 (citing Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469
(6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1983); In
154
155
156
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jority maintained that the validity of subpoenas requiring the
production of organizational entity business records have long
been recognized, and that even an individual's personal business
records are generally not privileged if their contents have been
disclosed to a third party. 6 ' The court reasoned that it would be
inequitable for sole proprietors, who may operate substantial
businesses, to be permitted to suppress their records because of
a fortuitous choice of business organization and also would afford white-collar criminals a means to insulate themselves from
criminal prosecutions. 162 Withholding the privilege from the
contents of all business documents could be accomplished, the
majority concluded, without violence to Boyd's privacy rationale
which would "still retain[] its full vigor as to those 'privacies of
life' which are beyond the pale of legitimate government
intrusion. "163
Justice Handler filed a dissenting opinion. 164 He asserted
that the majority had actually redefined and attenuated New
Jersey's common law privilege while claiming to affirm a Boydbased privacy interest underlying the privilege. 65 Justice Handler stated that the majority's withdrawal of the privilege from
sole proprietorship business records was inconsistent with its affirmation of the privilege's privacy rationale. 16 6 He declared that
the majority "succeed[ed]7 only in corrupting the rationale while
16
diluting the privilege."'
Justice Handler concurred with the majority's assessment of
the scope of the fifth amendment self-incrimination privilege in
the instant case.' 68 After reviewing the evolution of the fifth
amendment privilege in federal decisional law, Justice Handler
acknowledged that the federal interpretation of the self-incrimination privilege does not prevent the enforcement of a subpoena
compelling discovery of the contents of a sole proprietor's voluntarily prepared records or their production "as long as immunity
is furnished against the prosecutorial use of any of the testimore Grand Jury Proceedings (United States), 626 F.2d 1051, 1054 n.2 (1st Cir. 1980);
Developments In The Law-CorporateCrime: Regulating CorporateBehavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1286 (1979)).
161 Id. at 232, 516 A.2d at 1070.
162 Id. at 235, 516 A.2d at 1071-72.
163 Id. at 234, 516 A.2d at 1071.
164 Id. at 235, 516 A.2d at 1072 (Handler, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 237, 516 A.2d at 1072 (Handler, J., dissenting).
166 See id. at 237, 516 A.2d at 1072-73 (Handler, J., dissenting).
167 Id. at 237, 516 A.2d at 1073 (Handler, J., dissenting).
168 Id.
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nial effects attending such production." 169 He asserted, however, that the federal interpretation of the fifth amendment was
unsound. 170 Justice Handler posited that the focus of fifth
amendment analysis should include the contents of subpoenaed
documents, in addition to the testimonial incidents arising from
the act of their production. 17 ' The dissenting justice reasoned
that it is "the contents of documents, which are the heart of the
[f]ifth [a]mendment's solicitude for privacy and the true object of
17 2
the government's compulsory efforts."'
Accordingly, Justice Handler asserted that the New Jersey
common law privilege against self-incrimination should not be
corrupted by adoption of the federal distinction between a document's contents and its production. 1 73 He asserted that in practice the federal "bifurcation" of the disclosure of a document's
contents and the act of its production had proven problematic
and artificial.' 7 4 Justice Handler observed that by limiting the focus of fifth amendment privilege to the act of compelled production, courts are forced to determine whether the act of producing
subpoenaed documents is "testimonial," since only compelled
75
testimonial evidence is privileged.1
Justice Handler argued that this "somewhat unreal" determination would require "dissecting the act of production for evidence of such elusive and esoteric constructs as the 'tacit
concessions of evidence' or the 'implicit authentication' of documents."'1 76 He noted confusion and discomfort expressed by
lower federal courts applying the new fifth amendment test. 177
The justice counseled against the adoption of the new fifth
78
amendment analysis of Fisher and Doe. 1
Justice Handler next examined whether the documents in
question might be protected under the state privilege. 179 On this
point, the dissenting justice stated that decisional precedent as
169 Id.
170 Id.

at 243, 516 A.2d at 1076 (Handler, J., dissenting).
at 246, 516 A.2d at 1077 (Handler, J., dissenting).

171 Id.
172

Id. at 246, 516 A.2d at 1077-78 (Handler, J., dissenting).

173 Id. at 237, 516 A.2d at 1073 (Handler, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 244, 516 A.2d at 1076 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
175 Id. at 244-45, 516 A.2d at 1077 (Handler, J., dissenting).
176

Id. at 245, 516 A.2d at 1077 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

177 Id. at 245-46, 516 A.2d at 1077 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citing In re Grand

Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum dated November 13, 1984, 616 F. Supp. 1159, 1161
(E.D.N.Y. 1985); and United States v. In re John Doe No. 462, 745 F.2d 834 (4th
Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985)).
178 Id. at 244, 516 A.2d at 1076 (Handler, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 243, 516 A.2d at 1076 (Handler, J., dissenting).
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well as state tradition and public policy grounds support the
proposition that New Jersey common law is fully protective of
individual privacy. 8 ' Justice Handler reasoned that this underlying principle of state common law was derived from United States
v. Boyd. 8 ' He posited that this incorporation of Boyd "provides
firm grounds for rejecting, as a matter of common law, any analysis which diminishes the import of privacy interests."' 8 2
Justice Handler stressed that the need for judicial vigilance
to protect privacy interests was particularly compelling in instances involving a subpoena duces tecum. 18 3 The justice noted
that the primary purpose of a documentary subpoena is to enhance the prosecution's case by compelling disclosure of the
subpoenaed person's potentially incriminating papers. 184 With
this in mind, Justice Handler stated that in In re Addonizio, 185 the
New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the seriousness of such
intrusions on individual liberties and prohibited compulsory disclosure of the personal financial records of a grand jury target
witness. 186 Justice Handler asserted that this was done "[p]urely
to protect an individual from the damaging consequences of his
personal papers."' 8 7 Therefore, he concluded that the state
common law privilege prohibits compulsory production of an individual's incriminating "private and personal records relating to
' 88
the conduct of his sole business."'
Criticizing the majority opinion, Justice Handler commented
that the majority "purports to do what the [United States]
Supreme Court and other authorities have recognized to be impossible: to withdraw the privilege while retaining the privacy
rationale supporting it."' 8 9 Justice Handler reasoned that, unlike
a corporation or other collective entity, a sole proprietorship
does not have an identity independent from that of its owner. 190
Consequently, the difference between a sole proprietor's business and private affairs is so obscure that a clear distinction canId.
181 See id. at 248, 516 A.2d at 1079 (Handler, J., dissenting).
182 Id.
183 Id. at 250, 516 A.2d at 1080 (Handler, J., dissenting).
184 Id.
185 See supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text (discussing In re Addonizio).
186 Guarino, 104 N.J. at 250, 516 A.2d at 1080 (Handler, J., dissenting).
187 Id. at 251, 516 A.2d at 1080 (Handler, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 252, 516 A.2d at 1081 (Handler, J., dissenting).
189 See id. at 253, 516 A.2d at 1081-82 (Handler, J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 240, 516 A.2d at 1074 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citing Bellis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 84, 92-93 (1974)).
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not be made between them.' 9 ' Thus, Justice Handler disputed

the majority's contention that the protection of a sole proprietor's business records was an anomaly.' 92 He asserted that the

abandonment of fifth amendment protection for sole proprietorship business records "resulted not from a change of mind on the
narrow issue of whether such records are private ... but from a

change of heart on the general proposition that the privacy ...
implicate[d] [in such documents] matters."' 9 3 The Justice observed that the authorities cited by the majority reject a privacy
based distinction between a sole proprietorship and other busi-

ness entities. 9 4 This rejection resulted from the recognition that
under fifth amendment analysis the privacy expectation in the
contents of subpoenaed documents is irrelevant. 195 Therefore,
Justice Handler argued that the anomaly results from the erosion
of the fifth amendment's
privacy rationale, not from its faithful
96

application. 1
Justice Handler concluded by noting that he would also extend protection to the records in the instant case by broadly construing the state immunity statute. 19 7 He asserted that the scope
of protection afforded by the statutory immunity provision must
correspond directly with the scope of the common law privilege
itself. "9' 8 Accordingly, Justice Handler posited that when the
state has not shown that it obtained the incriminating testimonial
admissions independently of the privileged act of production, the
statutory language calls for independent protection of "all contents or, at a minimum.., derivative protection of a document's
contents."' 19 9
In Guarino, the New Jersey Supreme Court departed from
the federally established analytical framework used to determine
the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination. 20 0 Rejecting
the focus of the United States Supreme Court on the process of
compulsion rather than on the contents of subpoenaed documents, the New Jersey Supreme Court has demonstrated its re-

191 Id. at 253, 516 A.2d at 1082 (Handler, J., dissenting).
192 See id. at 252-53, 516 A.2d at 1081 (Handler, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 253, 516 A.2d at 1081 (Handler, J., dissenting).
194 Id.
195 Id. at 252, 516 A.2d at 1081 (Handler, J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 253, 516 A.2d at 1081 (Handler, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 254, 516 A.2d at 1082 (Handler, J., dissenting).
198 Id. at 255, 516 A.2d at 1082 (Handler,J., dissenting). See supra note 14 for text
of the New Jersey immunity statute.
199 Guarino, 104 N.J. at 255, 516 A.2d at 1082.
200 See id. at 232, 516 A.2d at 1070.
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solve to use principles of state constitutional and common law to
provide broad protection against compelled self-incrimination. 2 1 Regardless of the merits of the court's specific holdings,
the clear result of the Guarino case is the creation of two separate
standards of self-incrimination protection in document production cases. While inconsonant with the express intent of the
United States Supreme Court when-it extended the fifth amendment mandate to the states in 1964,202 the development of sepathe contemporary trend toward a
rate criteria is consistent with
20 3
new standard of federalism.
On a more pragmatic level, however, a problematic effect of
the Guarino court's holding will be the imposition of a heavy, perhaps intolerable, burden upon trial courts required to exercise its
mandate. While it held that sole proprietorship business records
are unprivileged, 20 4 the court continued to draw a distinction between the protection afforded business and private information
under the state privilege. The court specifically stated that the
result of the case might have been different if Guarino's business
records contained personal information. 20 5 The logical conclusion to be drawn from this assertion is that trial courts will be
required to ascertain whether a documentary demand for sole
proprietorship records impermissibly intrudes upon private aspects of the subpoenaed person's life.
This process may, under certain circumstances, prove highly
burdensome. As Justice Handler aptly noted in his dissent, the
distinction between the private and public affairs of a sole proprietor is often unclear, since the business has no true identity aside
from that of its owner.2 °6 Under the Guarino criteria, when a trial
court is confronted with a subpoena for sole proprietorship business records and the subpoenaed party contends that the subpoenaed records reflect protectible aspects of his private life, the
judge will be compelled to examine these records in camera in
See id. at 231-32, 516 A.2d at 1070.
See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964). The Malloy Court asserted that
"[i]t would be incongruous to have different standards determine the validity of a
claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution, depending on whether the
claim was asserted in a state or federal court." Id.
203 See, e.g., Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 709 (1983) ("[T]he Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution establishes a floor for basic human liberty .... [T]he state constitution establishes a ceiling.").
204 Guarino, 104 N.J. at 235, 516 A.2d at 1072.
205 Id. at 232 n.9, 516 A.2d at 1070 n.9.
206 Id. at 240, 253, 516 A.2d at 1074, 1082 (Handler, J., dissenting).
201

202
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order to effectuate suppression of privileged material. Rather
than having to "dissect" the act of production in search of "incriminating testimonial communications" as required under the
federal test, New Jersey courts will be engaged in the equally disheartening task of having to pore over business documents and
financial records to determine whether they contain personal information. In those cases involving large numbers of documents,
the trial court's task may become insurmountable.
Another problematic aspect of the court's holding, is the assertion that a goal of the privilege against self-incrimination is
the protection of privacy.20 7 Arguably, a form of privacy protection has always been one of the effects of the privilege, but the
notion that privacy protection is fundamental to the interests
protected by the privilege against self-incrimination is seriously
flawed. The fallacy in ascribing privacy concerns to the self-incrimination privilege arises from the incompatibility between the
limited goal of proscribing coerced self-condemnation and the
broad protection required to assure personal privacy. This incompatibility is highlighted by the fact that the self-incrimination
privilege protects only incriminating testimony. Private information of a non-incriminating nature is not afforded protection
from governmental inquiry, and may not be withheld regardless
of the individual's subjective desire to keep the information private. 208 Additionally, the disclosure of even privileged, incriminating information may be compelled by a grant of immunity.
Thus, the claim that the privilege protects privacy cannot be sustained in light of the government's ability to extract private
information.
The Fisher Court recognized the incompatibility between the
self-incrimination privilege and protection of privacy. 209 The
Court chose to eliminate privacy protection as a goal of the fifth
amendment privilege. Justice White perceived that the rule proscribing compulsory production of private papers derived from
Boyd's long mooted premise that a search warrant or subpoena
for "mere evidence" transgresses both the fourth and fifth
amendments.21 0 Consequently, the fifth amendment proscripId. at 230, 516 A.2d at 1069.
See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at § 121 (privilege against self-incrimination
does not protect against disclosure of information that will result only in societal
condemnation or personal disgrace).
209 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 400 (fifth amendment does not protect private information unless self-incriminating and compelled).
210 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409.
207
208
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tion against compelled production of private papers was a rule
without an adequate rationale. 2 1 '
The foregoing is not intended to suggest, however, that a
person's expectation of privacy in his personal papers is not constitutionally protected. The fourth amendment expressly provides for the privacy protection of papers.2 12 Moreover, the
United States Supreme Court has never addressed the question
of whether the contents of an individual's personal private papers
are constitutionally protected. It is therefore premature to conclude that the privacy of such information is no longer privileged
from compelled disclosure. As this area of the law continues to
evolve, the Court may formulate a specific constitutional standard of protection for the inherently private information contained in an individual's personal writings.2 13 What is made clear
by the Fisher and Doe cases, however, is that the protection of
these voluntarily created writings does not derive from the fifth
amendment.
In its eagerness to subsume the protection of individual privacy to the privilege against self-incrimination, the Guarino court
failed to address the Fisher Court's analysis of the evolution of
the fourth and fifth amendments in the context of document production. The court chose instead to rely on a flawed interpretation of Boyd v. United States as controlling precedent for the notion
that the privilege against self-incrimination affords a special sanctity to the contents of private papers.2 1 4 While correctly concluding that business records are not privileged from compelled
discovery, the court erred by refusing to recognize that a rationale consistent with the privilege against compelled incriminating
testimony, as it has evolved since Boyd, may no longer exist for
the proscription against compulsory production of private papers. Rather, the court perpetuates a rule of privacy for these
211 Id.; see also id. at 432 (Marshall, J., concurring) (recognizing the need for a
rationale consistent with the interests protected by the fifth amendment).
212 See supra note 30 for text of the fourth amendment; see also supra note 88 (discussing limitations of fourth amendment protection of private papers).
213 See generally Note, The Rights of CriminalDefendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum:
The Afternath of Fisher v. United States, 95 HARV. L. REV. 683 (1982) (discussing alternative constitutional grounds for safeguarding the contents of private papers).
214 See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text (discussing Bovd). Boyd's fourth
and fifth amendment prohibitions against the seizure of mere evidence by search
warrant or subpoena did not distinguish between documents and other forms of
evidence. See Heidt, supra note 36, at 456; see also Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298, 309 (1921) ("[t]here is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from
other forms of property, to render them immune from search and seizure . . .").
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papers under the rubric of the state privilege without thoroughly
examining the adequacy of its self-incrimination privilege rationale. Indeed, the analysis of both the majority and the minority
appears to be premised on a rejection of the federal limitation on
the scope of the fifth amendment, rather than on an adequate,
independent state ground. Consequently, in terms of both its
analysis and holdings, the court's opinion is problematic at best.
The privilege against self-incrimination is intended to protect individuals from governmental coercion to compel unwilling,
self-incriminating testimony. In applying the state or federal
guarantee, courts should focus on this specific interest. The protection of privacy or property should not enter into consideration
as factors in this analysis. Having sprung from a common root,
the federal and state self-incrimination privileges should not proceed to develop along divergent paths.
Edward M. Suarez, Jr.

